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When Will It Finally End: The Effectiveness of the 
Rule 10b-5 Private Action as a Fraud-Deterrence 
Mechanism Post-Janus 
I wasted no time; I got some people in, we drafted a rule, we 
presented it to the Commission, and, without any hesitation, the 
Commission tossed the paper on the table saying they were in 
favor of it. One Commission member said, “Well, we’re against 
fraud, aren’t we?” So, before the sun was down, we had the rule 
that is now Rule 10b-5.1  
The above is Milton Freeman’s succinct description of the 
process behind the passage of Rule 10b-5. Known as the “father of 
Rule 10b-5,” Freeman guided the effort that culminated in the 
rule’s birth.2 Passed pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5 is a broad antifraud provision that 
essentially prohibits all fraud in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities.3 At its birth, not even the “father of Rule 10b-5” 
could predict what his child would one day become.4 No one 
anticipated that Rule 10b-5 would give rise to a private right of 
action that would eventually become the subject of thousands of 
opinions attempting to define it.5 Neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 
10b-5 contains language providing for a private cause of action 
under the rule.6 Instead, federal courts have implied it.7 Hence, 
when courts look at the 10b-5 private action, they are dealing with 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2013, by JUSTIN MAROCCO. 
 1. Milton V. Freeman, Colloquium Foreword, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S1, 
S1–S2 (1993) (emphasis added). This occurred prior to the passage of the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, so the procedure to pass a new rule was 
much more informal than in the present day. See id. at S2. 
 2. See id. at S1, S3. 
 3. Rule 10b-5 prohibits: (1) employing “any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud”; (2) making “any untrue statement of a material fact or [failing] to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading”; and (3) 
engaging “in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
 4. See Freeman, supra note 1, at S2. 
 5. See W. Taylor Marshall, Note, Securities Law––The Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934––‘Round and ‘Round We Go: The Supreme Court Again 
Limits the Circumstances in Which Federal Courts May Hold Secondary Actors 
Liable Under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, Stoneridge Investment 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008), 31 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 197, 204 (2008); see also Freeman, supra note 1, at S2 
(evincing that the future of Rule 10b-5 was unexpected at its inception). 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 7. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
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“a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative 
acorn.”8 The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) passed Rule 
10b-5 to prevent fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of 
securities, and, despite a lack of express language providing for it, 
the private right of action is the method used to implement this 
deterrence purpose.9  
The Supreme Court’s recent holding in Janus Capital Group, 
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders puts the usefulness of the 10b-5 
private action as a fraud-deterrence mechanism in serious doubt.10 
In Janus, the Supreme Court clarified who “makes” a statement 
under Rule 10b-5.11 The Court determined that “the maker of a 
statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the 
statement, including its content and whether and how to 
communicate it.”12 Additionally, in a footnote, the majority 
provided that attribution of a statement is key evidence regarding 
who “makes” the statement.13 Consequently, Janus’s holding 
opens the door for lower federal courts to absolve corporate 
officers of liability for statements attributed solely to the 
corporation, even if those statements were prepared and distributed 
by the officer on the corporation’s behalf.14 This Note argues that 
Janus has severely limited the 10b-5 private action’s effectiveness 
as a fraud-deterrence mechanism and, in so doing, has removed 
much of the disincentive for corporate officers to commit fraud. 
Therefore, the SEC or Congress must step forward and take action 
to reestablish the 10b-5 private action as a fraud-deterrence 
mechanism. 
Part I of this Note provides a brief background regarding 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as well as a discussion on how 
                                                                                                             
 8. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
Justice Rehnquist’s oft-repeated analogy refers to the inability to decipher 
Congress’s intent regarding the “contours of a private cause of action under rule 
10b-5” based solely on the language of Section 10(b). Id.  
 9. See Freeman, supra note 1, at S1–S2; S. Michael Sirkin, The Deterrence 
Paradox: How Making Securities Fraud Class Actions More Difficult for 
Plaintiffs Will More Strongly Deter Corporate Fraud, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 307, 
311 (2009) (quoting Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)). Freeman recognizes that the primary impetus behind 
the passage of Rule 10b-5 was to prevent a company president from benefitting 
from his dishonest conduct. See Freeman, supra note 1, at S1. 
 10. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
 11. See id. at 2301. 
 12. Id. at 2302. 
 13. See id. at 2302 n.6. 
 14. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the private 10b-5 right of 
action. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Supp. V 2011); see also Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. 
Co., 437 U.S. 655, 659 (1978). 
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federal courts have implied the 10b-5 private cause of action. The 
discussion then shifts to the Supreme Court’s decision in Central 
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver and its rejection 
of aiding-and-abetting liability for the 10b-5 private action. Part I 
ends with an examination of the Court’s holding in Stoneridge 
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., in which the 
Court rejected “scheme liability.” Part II provides an in-depth 
discussion of Janus, including the case’s intricate facts, the 
majority’s holding, and the dissent’s counterargument. Part II 
concludes with a discussion of the primary problem that Janus 
created: the potential for corporate officers to escape liability for 
their unattributed misstatements. Part III analyzes how the private 
action should primarily be used for fraud deterrence and how 
Janus eliminates much of this usefulness. Part III also argues that 
Janus potentially affects the SEC’s ability to impose aiding-and-
abetting liability through an enforcement action. Furthermore, even 
if Janus does not affect the SEC enforcement action, relying on the 
enforcement action as the primary means to prosecute fraud and 
deter conduct is a recipe for disaster. Finally, Part III recognizes 
that Janus could signal a revival for Section 20(b) as an instrument 
to impose liability on corporate officers who use their company as 
the vehicle to carry out their fraudulent schemes. In Part IV, this 
Note concludes by proposing a solution in the form of either a 
federal statute or SEC rule addressing the problems that Janus 
created, specifically the potential for corporate officers to escape 
liability for their fraudulent misstatements. 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background 
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to deal 
with the weaknesses in the national securities markets that were 
thought to have contributed to the market crash of 1929 and the 
ensuing Great Depression.15 The Act regulates the post-distribution 
trading of securities16 and seeks to institute a full-disclosure 
                                                                                                             
 15. See Robert J. Grubb, II, Attorneys, Accountants, and Bankers, Oh My! 
Primary Liability for Secondary Actors in the Wake of Stoneridge, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 275, 281 (2009); Diana L. Hegarty, Rule 10b-5 and the Evolution of 
Common-Law Fraud—The Need for an Effective Statutory Proscription of 
Insider Tradition by Outsiders, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 813, 819 (1988). 
 16. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 
171 (1994) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 
(1975)). The Securities Act of 1933 regulates the initial distribution of securities 
to investors, whereas the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulates securities 
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philosophy in the markets.17 Pursuant to the Act, Congress created 
the SEC and granted it extensive rulemaking authority.18 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits the use of 
manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the purchase 
or sale of registered securities in violation of SEC rules and 
regulations.19 In isolation, Section 10(b) is “nonself-operative”: It 
requires an SEC rule or regulation to give it effect.20 Accordingly, 
the SEC drafted Rule 10b-5 pursuant to its authority under Section 
10(b).21 Of specific relevance, Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful “for 
any person, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o make any untrue statement 
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact . . . .”22  
Although neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 provide for it, 
federal courts have implied a private 10b-5 cause of action for 
private plaintiffs to pursue the rule’s violators.23 The first court to do 
so was the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Kardon v. National 
Gypsum Co.24 The Supreme Court confirmed the private action’s 
existence in 1971 and has consistently reaffirmed it.25  
                                                                                                             
 
transactions after their initial distribution, both on stock exchanges and over-the-
counter markets. Kenneth B. Orenbach, A New Twist to an On-Going Debate 
About Securities Self-Regulation: It’s Time to End FINRA’s Federal Income Tax 
Exemption, 31 VA. TAX REV. 135, 142 (2011). 
 17. Sirkin, supra note 9, at 310 (quoting Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital 
Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)). 
 18. Grubb, III, supra note 15, at 281 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006)). 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (Supp. V 2011). 
 20. Brian S. Sommer, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence: Improving 
Balance in the Private Securities Litigation Arena with a Screening Panel 
Approach, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 419 (2005) (quoting Joseph A. Grundfest, 
Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The 
Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 977 (1994)). 
 21. Hegarty, supra note 15, at 813.  
 22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
 23. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975). 
The elements of the 10b-5 private cause of action are: “(1) a material 
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection 
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a 
security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; 
and (6) loss causation.” Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 
2179, 2181 (2011) (quoting Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 
1309, 1317 (2011)). 
 24. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730 (citing Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 
69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)). 
 25. E.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 
148, 157 (2008). The Supreme Court first recognized the private cause of action 
in Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York v. Bankers Life & 
Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).  
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B. Applicable Case Law 
1. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver 
After years of primarily expanding Rule 10b-5 and the private 
right of action, the Supreme Court in Central Bank of Denver v. 
First Interstate Bank of Denver rendered a decision limiting the 
effectiveness of the 10b-5 private action as a fraud-deterrence 
mechanism by eliminating aiding-and-abetting liability under 
Section 10(b).26 Central Bank served as a trustee for bonds issued 
to finance improvements to a planned real estate development.27 
As part of the bond agreement, liens were imposed on the land 
where the planned development would be constructed.28 The 
agreement required that the land be worth at least 160% of the 
bonds’ remaining principal and interest amounts.29 Each year, the 
real estate developer needed to furnish Central Bank with an 
annual report in order for Central Bank to determine whether the 
160% test was being met.30 From 1986 to 1988, the developer’s 
annual report showed that the property value had not changed. As a 
result, Central Bank became concerned that the 160% test was not 
being satisfied.31 Central Bank initially decided to hire an outside 
appraiser to review the 1988 appraisal but subsequently decided to 
postpone the review until the end of 1988 after consulting with the 
                                                                                                             
 26. 511 U.S. 164 (1994); Scott M. Murray, Comment, Central Bank of 
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver: The Supreme Court Chops a Bough 
from the Judicial Oak: There is No Implied Private Remedy to Sue for Aiding 
and Abetting Under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
475, 478 n.17 (1996) (citing 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, 
SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD (1988)). According to Bromberg 
and Lowenfels, a period of expansion began in 1934 with the passage of Rule 
10b-5 and lasted until 1975. Murray, supra, at 478 n.17 (citing 1 BROMBERG & 
LOWENFELS, supra § 2.2, at 461–530). Next, the Supreme Court went through a 
seven-year period of contraction, but this period ended in 1982 when the Court 
shifted from its restrictive trend. Murray, supra, at 478 n.17 (citing 1 BROMBERG 
& LOWENFELS, supra § 2.2, at 463; Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 
U.S. 375 (1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 
(1982)). 
 27. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 
164, 167 (1994); see also Scott Siamas, Comment, Primary Securities Fraud 
Liability for Secondary Actors: Revisiting Central Bank of Denver in the Wake 
of Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 895, 902 
(2004). 
 28. See Carrie E. Goodwin, Note, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank: Not 
Just the End of Aiding and Abetting Under Section 10(b), 52 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1387, 1399 (1995). 
 29. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 167. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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developer.32 Before Central Bank could complete the independent 
review, the issuer defaulted on the bonds.33  
First Interstate Bank had purchased a sizeable portion of the 
bonds.34 Due to its losses, First Interstate sued Central Bank for 
violating Section 10(b) through recklessly aiding and abetting the 
developer’s alleged fraudulent inflation of the property value.35 
First Interstate did not seek to hold Central Bank liable for 
violating the provisions of Section 10(b). Rather, it sought to hold 
Central Bank liable for assisting with the developer’s alleged 
Section 10(b) violation.36 After the lower courts focused on 
whether Central Bank had the requisite scienter37 for imposing 
aiding-and-abetting liability, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
but also requested that the parties brief the entirely new issue of 
whether there actually was an aiding-and-abetting cause of action 
under Section 10(b).38  
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court rejected 30 years of lower court 
precedent by holding that a private plaintiff could not sustain an 
aiding-and-abetting action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.39 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on a strict construction of 
Section 10(b).40 Looking at the text and history of Section 10(b), the 
                                                                                                             
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 168. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id.; see also Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Corruption and the 
Complicity of Congress and the Supreme Court—The Tortious Path from 
Central Bank to Stoneridge Investment Partners, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131, 164 
(2009). First Interstate claimed that the developer was primarily liable under 
Section 10(b) because it “fraudulently inflated the value of the Colorado real 
estate.” Goodwin, supra note 28, at 1401. 
 36. See Goodwin, supra note 28, at 1398. 
 37. Scienter refers to the “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 216 (1976). It is one of the elements of the 
10b-5 private action. See discussion supra note 23. 
 38. Glen Shu, Comment, Take a Second Look: Central Bank After the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 539, 552 
(1996). “The Court directed the parties to brief and argue the following 
question: ‘Whether there is an implied private right of action for aiding and 
abetting violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
SEC Rule 10b-5.’” Id. at 552 n.60 (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, 508 U.S. 959, 959 (1993) (mem.)). 
 39. Robert A. Prentice, Locating That “Indistinct” and “Virtually 
Nonexistent” Line Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(B), 
75 N.C. L. REV. 691, 691 (1997); Murdock, supra note 35, at 163; Marshall, supra 
note 5, at 211. 
 40. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 
164, 173 (1994); John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and 
Winding Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. 
LAW. 335, 341 (1996). 
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Court found that Section 10(b) and the 10b-5 private action do not 
impose aiding-and-abetting liability.41 Nevertheless, the Central 
Bank majority limited its holding to maintain the possibility for 
secondary actors42 to be primarily liable under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.43 After Central Bank, because secondary actors could 
be primarily liable under Section 10(b) but not secondarily liable, 
the Court would need to establish the line between primary liability 
and secondary–aiding-and-abetting liability.44  
2. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 
Inc. 
Fourteen years after its Central Bank decision, the Supreme 
Court began to define the line between primary and secondary 
liability in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc.45 The fraudulent scheme in Stoneridge involved three 
parties: Charter Communications (Charter), Scientific-Atlanta, and 
Motorola.46 After Charter realized that it would fall short of its 
yearly projected operating cash flow, it enlisted the help of its 
suppliers, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, to help erase the 
shortfall.47 Charter agreed to overpay $20 for each cable box, and 
in return Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta agreed to use the 
overpayments to purchase additional advertising from Charter.48 
Charter executed its nefarious scheme through deceptive contracts 
that were intentionally backdated in an attempt to hide their 
connectivity.49 As a result of these contracts, Charter was able to 
inflate its revenue and operating cash flow by $17 million, a figure 
that was included in Charter’s SEC filings and reports to the 
                                                                                                             
 41. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 183. 
 42. The term secondary actors refers to every entity or individual who is 
not the direct issuer of securities. Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Scope of 
Secondary Actor Liability: Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 122 HARV. L. REV. 485, 485 n.3 (2008) (citing Taavi Annus, Note, 
Scheme Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72 
MO. L. REV. 855, 858 & n.25 (2007)). 
 43. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. 
 44. Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Scope of Secondary Actor Liability, 
supra note 42, at 485. See also Siamas, supra note 27, at 902. Primary liability 
involves violating the provisions of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. See Cent. 
Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. 
 45. 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 46. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 
148, 153–54 (2008). 
 47. Id. at 153. 
 48. Id. at 154. 
 49. See id. at 154–55. 
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public.50 Despite actively engaging in the fraud, neither Scientific-
Atlanta nor Motorola aided in preparing, filing, or distributing 
Charter’s financial statements.51  
After the scheme came to light, Stoneridge filed a class action 
lawsuit against Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, alleging that their 
participation in the fraudulent scheme was a violation of Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.52 Stoneridge sought to impose “scheme 
liability” (not aiding-and-abetting liability) on Motorola and 
Scientific-Atlanta, on the grounds that their conduct helped further 
Charter’s fraudulent scheme.53 Eventually, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to resolve a split between the Eighth and Ninth 
Circuits regarding the validity of scheme liability.54  
                                                                                                             
 50. Id. at 155; Grant T. Maynard, Comment, Catch Me if You Can: An 
Analysis of the Reduction of Secondary Actors’ Private Liability in § 10(b) 
Cases in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. 
Ct. 761 (2008), 88 NEB. L. REV. 561, 569–70 (2010). 
 51. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 155. 
 52. See id.; Nelson Waneka, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-
Atlanta: Rethinking the Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption and the Policy 
Considerations Permeating the Court’s Decision, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 303, 314 
(2008). 
 53. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159–60. Scheme liability provides that a 
secondary actor who engages “in deceptive acts can be liable if [he] participate[s] 
in a scheme to defraud investors, which results in misrepresentations being made 
to investors.” Charles J. Wilkes, Secondary-Actor Liability in a Post-Stoneridge 
World: Yes, a Successful Suit Against Secondary Actors Is Still Possible, 40 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1811, 1822 (2010) (citing Simpson v. AOL Time Warner 
Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Simpson v. 
Homestore.com, Inc., 519 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2008)). The court in Simpson stated:  
[T]o be liable as a primary violator of § 10(b) for participation in a 
“scheme to defraud,” the defendant must have engaged in conduct that 
had the principal purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of 
fact in furtherance of the scheme. It is not enough that a transaction in 
which a defendant was involved had a deceptive purpose and effect; the 
defendant's own conduct contributing to the transaction or overall 
scheme must have had a deceptive purpose and effect. 
Id. at 1048. 
 54. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 156; Maynard, supra note 50, at 568. Court 
of appeals decisions were in conflict regarding whether an injured investor could 
rely on Section 10(b) to recover damages from a party who neither made a 
public misstatement nor violated a duty to disclose but did participate in the 
scheme that violated Section 10(b). Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 156. The Eighth 
Circuit found that a plaintiff could not establish reliance if the secondary actor 
did not issue a statement to the public. Maynard, supra note 50, at 568 (citing In 
re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2006)). Counter 
to the Eighth Circuit’s holding, the Ninth Circuit found that reliance could be 
established if the misstatement’s introduction into the securities market “was the 
intended end result of a scheme to misrepresent revenue.” Id. (quoting Simpson 
v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. 
2013] COMMENT 641 
 
 
 
As in Central Bank, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority 
opinion.55 In its decision, the Court rejected Stoneridge’s scheme-
liability theory.56 Citing the outside investors’ lack of reliance, the 
majority found that neither Scientific-Atlanta nor Motorola could 
be liable in a 10b-5 private class action.57 As the Court noted, 
reliance is essential to the 10b-5 private action.58 During the 
relevant time period, no public investor had knowledge of 
Scientific-Atlanta’s or Motorola’s deceptive conduct.59 Charter 
deceived its auditors and filed the financial statements, not 
Scientific-Atlanta or Motorola.60 Nothing Scientific-Atlanta or 
Motorola did led to the necessary or inevitable consequence that 
Charter would record the transactions in the way that it did.61 Thus, 
their acts were too remote to establish reliance.62 Stoneridge 
unsuccessfully argued that reliance could be established because 
issuance of Charter’s deceptive financial statements was the 
natural consequence of Scientific-Atlanta’s and Motorola’s 
fraudulent conduct.63 However, the Court found this causal 
progression too remote and indirect to impose liability.64 
Accordingly, neither Scientific-Atlanta nor Motorola were liable 
for their blatant and unconscionable fraudulent conduct.65  
As in Central Bank, the Court took certain steps to limit the 
reach of its decision. To avoid any misconception that Stoneridge 
established an oral or written statement requirement, the majority 
emphasized that conduct itself can be deceptive and can be the 
basis for imposing liability in a 10b-5 private action.66 Thus, 
Stoneridge began to clarify the line between primary and 
                                                                                                             
 
Simpson v. Homestore.com, Inc., 519 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2008)). The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 156. 
 55. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 
166 (1994); Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 151. 
 56. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159–64. 
 57. Id. at 159. 
 58. See id. The Court used the phrase “§10(b) private cause of action,” 
which is the same thing as the private Rule 10b-5 cause of action. Id. See also 
discussion supra note 23 (regarding elements of the Rule 10b-5 private action). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 161. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. at 160. 
 64. See id. at 159. 
 65. See id. at 160; Murdock, supra note 35, at 196. 
 66. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159. 
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secondary aiding-and-abetting liability.67 After Stoneridge, it 
appears that if a plaintiff is attacking a material misstatement, then 
the defendant needs to “make” that statement for liability to be 
imposed in a 10b-5 private action and not simply aid in a behind-
the-scenes scheme resulting in the statement’s dissemination. This 
of course leads to the obvious question: Who actually “makes” a 
statement under Rule 10b-5? Unlike the 14-year delay between 
Central Bank and Stoneridge, the financial and legal community 
would have to wait a mere two years for the Court to clarify the 
meaning of make under Rule 10b-5 and, as a result of this 
clarification, to further limit the effectiveness of the 10b-5 private 
action as a fraud-deterrence mechanism. 
II. THE JANUS DECISION 
A. Majority and Dissenting Opinions 
1. Background Facts 
The Supreme Court in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First 
Derivative Traders confronted the question of whether a closely-
related investment advisor could be liable in a 10b-5 private action 
for false statements that it incorporated into its client’s mutual fund 
prospectuses.68 Janus Capital Group, Inc. (Janus Capital) created a 
family of mutual funds known as the Janus Investment Fund 
(JIF).69 JIF was a separate legal entity that investors entirely 
owned.70 JIF retained Janus Capital Management (JCM), a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Janus Capital, to be its investment advisor.71 
At all relevant times, JCM and JIF were closely connected.72 Every 
JIF employee was also a JCM officer, and all of JIF’s officers were 
vice presidents of JCM.73 Yet, because only a single JIF board 
member was associated with JCM, JIF had the requisite 
independence for a mutual fund.74  
                                                                                                             
 67. WILLIAM O. FISHER, VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING 
NEGOTIATION *36–39 (2011), available at Westlaw VCPON CH 36 S 5 D. 
 68. 131 S. Ct. 2296. 
 69. Id. at 2299. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. at 2306. 
 73. Id. at 2306, 2312. 
 74. See id. at 2299. According to the relevant federal statute, 60% of a 
mutual fund’s board of directors can be comprised of “interested persons.” 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2006).  
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Nonetheless, when the substance of the relationship between a 
mutual fund and its investment advisor is scrutinized, it appears 
doubtful that JIF and JCM were truly independent. In a mutual 
fund, the investment advisor establishes the fund’s structure.75 The 
advisor acts as the operational life-support system for the mutual 
fund, providing it with substantially all of its management and 
business infrastructure.76 Ordinarily, the investment advisor 
appoints the mutual fund’s board of trustees, who, as a result, 
consistently retains him to manage the fund.77 Combining these 
realities regarding investment advisors with the relationship 
between JIF and JCM, it seems that any conclusion that JIF and 
JCM were independent is based more on form and technicalities 
rather than the actual substance of their relationship. 
Acting through its officers, JCM managed the mutual funds’ 
investments; prepared, modified, and implemented long-term 
strategies; and conducted day-to-day activities.78 As required by 
federal law, JIF had to issue and file prospectuses outlining both 
strategy and operations for each mutual fund.79 JCM’s employees 
drafted and reviewed the prospectuses and distributed them 
through the Janus Capital website.80 Yet, it was JIF who was 
credited with filing the prospectuses.81 Interestingly, because all 
JIF employees were also JCM officers, it was actually JCM 
officers who filed the JIF prospectuses.82 These prospectuses stated 
that several of the JIF mutual funds were not meant for market 
timing and could have been interpreted to represent that JCM 
would establish rules to restrain the market timing practice.83 
                                                                                                             
 75. William A. Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline: A Behavioral Approach 
to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 69 (2010). 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 70. A board of trustees is another name for a mutual fund’s board 
of directors. Frequently Asked Questions About Mutual Fund Directors, INV. 
CO. INST., http://www.ici.org/pubs/faqs/ci.faq_fund_gov_idc.idc (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2012). 
 78. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2306. 
 79. Id. at 2300. 
 80. Id. at 2312. 
 81. Id. at 2304. 
 82. See id. at 2306. 
 83. Id. at 2300. According to the court in Janus: 
Market timing is a trading strategy that exploits time delay in mutual 
funds’ daily valuation system. The price for buying or selling shares of 
a mutual fund is ordinarily determined by the next net asset value 
(NAV) calculation after the order is placed. The NAV calculation 
usually happens once a day, at the close of the major U.S. markets. 
Because of certain time delays, however, the values used in these 
calculations do not always accurately reflect the true value of the 
underlying assets. For example, a fund may value its foreign securities 
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However, these statements were not entirely truthful. In a 
subsequent complaint filed against both Janus Capital and JCM, 
the New York Attorney General alleged that Janus Capital secretly 
entered into agreements to permit market timing in numerous 
mutual funds run by JCM, contrary to the previous statements in 
the prospectuses.84 
After the Attorney General filed the complaint, numerous 
investors withdrew their money from JIF.85 As JIF’s investment 
advisor, JCM received compensation from JIF proportionate to the 
total value of the mutual funds.86 This compensation made up a 
large portion of Janus Capital’s income.87 Consequently, due to 
JIF’s losses, Janus Capital and its investors suffered financial 
harm.88 As a result, Janus Capital stockholders, represented by 
First Derivate Traders, filed a class action lawsuit against Janus 
Capital and JCM.89 
In its complaint, First Derivative Traders averred that both 
Janus Capital and JCM materially misled investors through 
statements contained in the prospectuses.90 Initially, the Maryland 
District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.91 
The district court absolved Janus Capital of liability because it did 
not “make” the misstatements.92 On the other hand, the court found 
                                                                                                             
 
based on the price at the close of the foreign market, which may have 
occurred several hours before the calculation. But events might have 
taken place after the close of the foreign market that could be expected 
to affect their price. If the event were expected to increase the price of 
the foreign securities, a market-timing investor could buy shares of a 
mutual fund at the artificially low NAV and sell the next day when the 
NAV corrects itself upward. 
Id. at 2300 n.1 (citing Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective 
Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 68 Fed. Reg. 70402 (proposed Dec. 17, 2003) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239 and 274)). “Although market timing is 
legal, it harms other investors in the mutual fund.” Id. at 2300. Because it is 
currently a legal practice, one of the few ways to prevent market timing is for 
the mutual fund to institute policies and procedures against it, which is what 
JCM implied it was doing in the prospectuses. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. See also Birdthistle, supra note 75, at 70. The investment advisor’s 
fee is a percentage of the underlying mutual fund assets. Birdthistle, supra note 
75, at 69. 
 87. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. at 2301. 
 91. Id. (citing In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d 618, 620 (D. 
Md. 2007), rev’d, 566 F.3d 111, 121 (4th Cir. 2009)). 
 92. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 622. 
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that JCM did “make” the misstatements, but it could not be liable 
to Janus Capital’s shareholders because it did not actually purchase 
any mutual fund shares.93 The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that 
both Janus Capital and JCM did “make” the misleading statements 
by participating in the writing and dissemination of the 
prospectuses.94 The Supreme Court granted writs specifically to 
determine whether JCM “made” the misstatements and thus could 
be liable in a 10b-5 private action for the misstatements regarding 
market timing.95 
2. Majority Reasoning 
The majority absolved JCM of liability because it did not 
“make” the material misstatements in the prospectuses.96 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Thomas relied on the Oxford English 
Dictionary to show that the phrase “to make any . . . statement” 
was approximately equivalent to the phrase “to state.”97 
Concluding that the meaning of make was unambiguous,98 the 
majority ruled that “[f]or purposes of Rule 10b–5, the maker of a 
statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the 
statement, including its content and whether and how to 
communicate it.”99 Individuals or entities without ultimate control 
can only give suggestions regarding a statement; they cannot 
actually “make” the statement.100 Furthermore, “attribution within 
a statement or implicit from surrounding circumstances is strong 
evidence that a statement was made by––and only by––the party to 
whom it is attributed.”101 According to Justice Thomas, JIF, and 
not JCM, did “make” the misstatements because JIF solely bore 
the obligation to file the prospectuses and because it was the party 
that filed them.102  
                                                                                                             
 93. Id. at 624. 
 94. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301 (quoting In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 
111, 121 (4th Cir. 2009)). 
 95. See id. Despite finding that Janus Capital did “make” the misstatements, 
the Fourth Circuit determined that Janus Capital could only be liable under 
Section 20(a) for being a “control person” of JCM. Id. As a result, they were not 
involved in the case upon it reaching the Supreme Court. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 2302. 
 98. Id. at 2303 n.8. 
 99. Id. at 2302. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 2304–05. However, it was truly JCM officers who filed the 
prospectuses because every employee of JIF was a JCM officer. See discussion 
supra Part II.A.1. 
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To emphasize the point, Justice Thomas analogized the 
situation to the relationship between a speaker and a 
speechwriter.103 The speechwriter drafts the speech, but the 
speaker has ultimate control over its content and bears ultimate 
responsibility for what is said.104 According to the Court, its 
definition of make followed from its prior holdings in Central 
Bank and Stoneridge.105 The majority found that there would be no 
distinction between primary violators and those who aid and abet if 
they adopted a broader view of make to include persons or entities 
lacking ultimate authority over a statement.106 In the majority’s 
view, the dissent’s argument for a broader definition would 
undercut Central Bank because a broader definition would 
eliminate most of the distinction between primary and secondary 
aiding-and-abetting liability.107 Turning its attention to Stoneridge, 
the Court focused on its language that the defendants could not be 
liable because their actions did not make it necessary or inevitable 
that Charter would record the transactions in the way it did.108 In 
its opinion, the Janus majority’s definition of make flowed from 
Stoneridge, because only with ultimate authority over a statement’s 
content and means of communication does it become necessary 
and inevitable that a misrepresentation will appear in the 
statement.109 Finally, in an attempt to remove any uncertainty 
regarding the definition, the Court rejected the Government’s 
argument that make is the equivalent of create.110 Therefore, 
despite JCM’s substantial involvement in creating and distributing 
the prospectuses, JCM did not “make” the material misstatements 
because JIF actually controlled the content and distribution of the 
prospectuses.111 Effectively, JCM was the speechwriter, and JIF 
was the speaker.112 
3. Dissent 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer argued that both language and 
precedent prove that numerous individuals can make a statement 
that appears in a firm’s prospectus, even though the board of 
                                                                                                             
 103. Id. at 2302. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 2302–03. 
 106. Id. at 2302. 
 107. See id. at 2302 n.6. 
 108. Id. at 2303. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. at 2305. 
 112. Id. 
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directors has ultimate control over its content.113 Thus, JCM should 
have been liable for making the material misstatements 
incorporated into the prospectuses.114  
To refute the rigid boundaries that the majority imposed, 
Justice Breyer relied on everyday examples to argue that an 
individual can “make” a statement even if he is not the person with 
ultimate authority.115 For example, cabinet officials regularly make 
statements on subjects over which the president has ultimate 
authority under the Constitution.116 Similarly, company employees 
make statements over which other individuals within the 
corporation have control.117  
Additionally, the dissent asserted that the majority incorrectly 
relied on Central Bank and Stoneridge.118 Central Bank dealt with 
secondary aiding-and-abetting liability, whereas Janus involved 
primary liability.119 According to Justice Breyer, the majority’s 
rule extended Central Bank to new and rejected territory.120 
Furthermore, he argued that Stoneridge was distinguishable from 
Janus.121 The Stoneridge Court analyzed whether investors could 
rely on Scientific-Atlanta’s and Motorola’s behind-the-scenes 
actions.122 In Justice Breyer’s opinion, that was a much different 
inquiry than the Janus majority’s evaluation concerning whether a 
particular actor “makes” a material misstatement.123 
Finally, the dissent recognized a potential problem with Janus: 
the fact that, in certain situations, neither corporate officers 
composing the statements nor the corporation’s board of directors 
can be held liable in a 10b-5 private action.124 This is one of the 
problems arising from separating the person that “makes” the 
statement from the person who actually drafts it knowing it to be 
false. If the speechwriter drafts the statement knowing that it is 
false and the innocent speaker delivers it under the belief that it is 
true, the speaker will be the person who “makes” the statement 
under Janus. However, because the speaker lacks any knowledge 
regarding the statement’s falsity, will courts be willing to impute 
                                                                                                             
 113. Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 114. See id.  
 115. Id. at 2307. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. at 2307–10. 
 119. See id. at 2307–08. 
 120. See id. at 2308. Janus is doing precisely what Central Bank claimed it 
was not doing: immunizing secondary actors. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 121. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2308–09 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. at 2309–10. 
 124. Id. at 2310. 
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the speechwriter’s scienter to the speaker?125 In Justice Breyer’s 
opinion, both parties could escape liability in this scenario, which 
seems to imply that he believes that courts will not impute the 
speechwriter’s scienter to the officer.126 
B. Critique of the Janus Majority’s Reasoning 
1. Potential Absolution of Corporate Officers 
The Janus majority has made it possible for corporate officers 
and other corporate agents to escape liability for deliberately 
fraudulent actions.127 In Janus, the Supreme Court held that “the 
maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority 
over the statement.”128 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
attribution of a statement, whether express or implicit, “is strong 
evidence that a statement was made by––and only by––the party to 
whom it is attributed.”129 Additionally, the majority explicitly 
rejected the SEC’s argument that equated make with create, stating 
that this would be inconsistent with precedent.130 Combined, these 
legal assertions could lead to disastrous results. Potentially, 
corporate officers and agents could escape liability for their 
fraudulent actions in creating and distributing a material 
misstatement to the public, so long as that misstatement is 
attributed to the corporation rather than to the agents and officers 
personally.  
While it is true that this attribution presumption could be 
overcome, the plaintiff would still need to prove that the person––
to whom the statement was not attributed––was “the person or 
entity with ultimate authority” over it.131 Justice Thomas gives no 
indication regarding what he means by “ultimate authority.”132 
However, in absolving JCM of liability, he does imply that “the 
person or entity with ultimate authority” is the person or entity 
with formal control over the statement rather than the person or 
                                                                                                             
 125. See discussion supra note 37 (regarding scienter). 
 126. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 127. While an argument can be made that Janus’s definition of make should 
be limited to cases involving legally separate entities, at least one court has 
acknowledged that nothing in Janus limits the language to just those cases; thus, 
it can be applied to corporate insiders. See Haw. Ironworkers Annuity Trust 
Fund v. Cole, 2011 WL 3862206, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2011). 
 128. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 2303. 
 131. Id. at 2302. 
 132. Id. 
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entity with substantive control. Based on the facts of Janus, as well 
as the nature of the relationship between an investment advisor and 
a mutual fund, JCM had substantive control over JIF and thus had 
ultimate authority over JIF’s statements.133 Nonetheless, Justice 
Thomas focused on the fact that JCM and JIF were formally 
independent because only a single JIF director was associated with 
JCM.134 In his opinion, because JIF was a separate legal entity, 
JCM did not “make” the misstatements contained in the 
prospectuses because JCM did not have ultimate control over 
them.135 Therefore, based on the majority’s opinion, “ultimate 
authority” should be viewed as synonymous with formal authority.  
It will be a rare case when a corporate officer will be deemed 
to have “ultimate authority” over a statement that is not attributed 
to him. In a corporation, “the board of directors is the ultimate 
decision-making body.”136 Thus, under the plain language of 
Janus, the board of directors would always be the entity with 
ultimate authority over any statements issued by the company 
because it is “the ultimate decision-making body” and has formal 
authority over the corporation and its officers.137 Even if, in reality, 
the officer has control over the statement due to his experience and 
position within his company, the Janus majority appears unwilling 
to look past formal control when determining which person or 
entity has ultimate authority over a statement. Consequently, 
Janus’s plain language does not leave open the possibility for 
corporate officers to “make” statements that are not attributed to 
them because the board of directors has formal authority over all 
officers and all statements.  
The majority’s opinion effectively rejects the Court’s analysis 
in Central Bank. In Central Bank, the Court stated that secondary 
actors could still be primarily liable for their actions, just not 
responsible for secondary aiding-and-abetting liability.138 Yet, after 
                                                                                                             
 133. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 134. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299. 
 135. See id. at 2304–05. 
 136. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 290 (1999) (citing Robert C. Clark, Agency 
Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF 
BUSINESS 56 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)). Additionally, 
the board of directors is generally characterized as “the corporation.” Id. (citing 
Clark, supra, at 56). 
 137. See id. 
 138. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. The Court in Central Bank found that 
the 10b-5 private action could not impose aiding-and-abetting liability on 
secondary actors. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 
U.S. 164, 183 (1994). Yet, secondary actors could still be primarily liable for 
violating Rule 10b-5. Id. at 191. 
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Janus, this is no longer the case. It is true that secondary actors 
could still be primarily liable for disseminated misstatements, if 
those statements are attributed to them. However, for all practical 
purposes, secondary actors will never be liable for the fraudulent 
statements that they construct because after Janus, no corporate 
officers will be foolish enough to voluntarily attribute a statement 
to themselves. Instead, all statements will be credited to the 
company, and the corporate officers who actually perpetrate the 
fraud will escape liability under Rule 10b-5. 
Nevertheless, the Janus majority’s definition of make and its 
statement regarding attribution are consistent with the Stoneridge 
holding regarding reliance. The Supreme Court in Stoneridge 
refused to impose liability on both Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola 
because no investors had knowledge of their unseen fraudulent 
acts, and thus no investor could show reliance on their fraudulent 
conduct.139 If a corporate officer issues an unattributed statement, 
no one will have knowledge of his behind-the-scenes fraudulent 
acts; rather, investors will only be aware of the disseminated 
statement that is attributed to the company. Additionally, unless 
the person has ultimate authority over the statements, his actions 
do not make it necessary and inevitable that a statement will be 
written or disseminated in a particular manner.140 
However, consistency with Stoneridge does not erase the 
problems with the Janus decision. Consider the following 
hypothetical: A corporate officer, who has been working for 
several months on closing one of the company’s operating 
divisions, composes a press release to deny that the company has 
any plans to do so. The release states that the company has no 
future plans to close any divisions. The officer does not attribute 
the press release to himself. The statement is attributed solely to 
the corporation. One week later, the company closes its most 
profitable operating division and lays off hundreds of workers. 
Later, the media discovers that the company had been planning to 
close this division for over a year. After a precipitous drop in the 
company’s stock value, investors file a 10b-5 private class action 
against the corporation.  
Taking Janus at face value, only the corporation is liable for 
the material misstatements, not the officer who created them. The 
press release was attributed to only the corporation, not the 
corporate officer, and attribution is strong evidence that the 
                                                                                                             
 139. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
 140. See id. 
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statement was only made by the entity to which it is attributed.141 
The corporation has ultimate responsibility over the statement and 
whether to issue it, and the corporation would be the only party 
that made the misstatement under Rule 10b-5, based on the plain 
language of Janus.142  
Furthermore, scholars have already recognized that Janus’s 
attribution language is a distinct problem. In a hearing before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, James Cox, Professor of Law at Duke 
University, acknowledged that, under Janus, statements are made 
only by the corporate entity, as opposed to any of the innumerable 
individuals who review a statement before it is issued.143 Similarly, 
Joseph Franco, law professor at Suffolk University Law School, 
pointed out that even the person who drafts a disclosure with 
knowledge of its falsity will not be primarily liable for fraud, as 
long as another person distributes the disclosure in his own 
name.144  
 
                                                                                                             
 141. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 
2302 (2011). 
 142. The board of directors––which is generally characterized as “the 
corporation”—is the “ultimate decision-making body,” and consequently has 
ultimate authority over all statements issued by the corporation. See Blair & 
Stout, supra note 136, at 290 (citing Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus 
Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 56 
(John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)). 
 143. See Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court's 
Recent Rulings Will Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary 
Comm., 112th Cong. 77 (2011) (statement of James Cox, Brainerd Currie 
Professor of Law at Duke University Law School) (“[F]inancial reports pass 
through multiple individuals, each of which provides the voice to the inanimate 
corporate entity. The reasoning of Janus Capital is that none of these actors 
makes a statement as the statement can only be understood to have been made 
by the entity, which, of course, is powerless to make any statement.”). 
 144. Joseph A. Franco, Of Complicity and Compliance: A Rules-Based Anti-
Complicity Strategy Under Federal Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 59 
(2011). In his article, Franco argues: 
Thus, according to the majority, merely drafting a false disclosure with 
knowledge of its falsity and subsequently deceiving another into 
believing that the statement is accurate, does not alone make an 
individual primarily liable for fraud, so long as the other person 
disseminates the statement in its own name. In trying to distinguish 
primary liability and aiding and abetting, the Court has actually crafted 
a rule insulating from liability those who in fact may be primarily 
responsible. 
Id. at 59. When a corporate officer creates a statement attributed to the company, 
which is subsequently issued in the company’s name, that officer will escape 
liability under Janus’s formalistic test because the other legal person (the 
company) issued the statement in its own name. See id. 
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2. Subsequent Lower Court Decisions 
a. In re Merck & Co., Inc. Securities, Derivative & “ERISA” 
Litigation 
Almost immediately after Janus, lower courts began to 
interpret and apply it.145 In In re Merck & Co., stockowners sued 
Merck and its executives for alleged overstatements regarding the 
commercial viability of the medication Vioxx.146 The plaintiffs 
alleged that Merck downplayed the potential link between the 
medication and increased health risks, despite substantial evidence 
confirming the link.147 Plaintiffs joined Edward Scolnick, the 
former Executive Vice President of Merck, as an individual 
defendant.148 The plaintiffs credited seven public misstatements 
regarding Vioxx to Scolnick.149 In defense, Scolnick argued that 
even though the statements were attributed to him, he could not be 
liable for them because the plaintiffs failed to allege that he 
possessed ultimate authority over those statements.150 In Scolnick’s 
opinion, Janus established that attribution was necessary but not 
sufficient by itself for a 10b-5 claim.151 In essence, Scolnick 
argued that something in addition to attribution was required under 
Janus. The court found that Scolnick did “make” the attributed, 
public misstatements.152 Scolnick made each misstatement 
pursuant to his authority as a Merck officer.153 According to the 
court, Janus did not change the rule that a corporation can only act 
through its agents.154 The court then stated: 
[Janus] certainly cannot be read to restrict liability for Rule 
10b-5 claims against corporate officers to instances in which 
a plaintiff can plead, and ultimately prove, that those 
officers—as opposed to the corporation itself—had 
“ultimate authority” over the statement. Yet, this is the 
premise that underlies Scolnick’s argument that he may not 
be liable for statements actually attributed to him. Taken to 
                                                                                                             
 145. In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 2011 WL 
3444199 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011). 
 146. Id. at *1. 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. at *1 n.1, *25. 
 149. See id. at *23. 
 150. See id. at *24. 
 151. See id. at *25. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See id. (quoting Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 
250 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
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its logical conclusion, Scolnick’s position would absolve 
corporate officers of primary liability for all Rule 10b-5 
claims, because ultimately, the statements are within the 
control of the corporation which employs them.155 
Unlike Janus, the court in In re Merck & Co. dealt with 
statements actually attributed to the corporate officer. Nevertheless, 
the district court appeared to acknowledge that it would refuse to 
apply any interpretation of Janus that completely absolves corporate 
officers of liability for their fraudulent acts. The court balked at 
adopting Scolnick’s argument because it would “absolve corporate 
officers of primary liability for all Rule 10b-5 claims.”156 
b. City of Roseville Employees’ Retirement System v. 
EnergySolutions, Inc. 
In another post-Janus decision, City of Roseville Employees’ 
Retirement System v. EnergySolutions, Inc., the New York 
Southern District Court looked at which of the defendants made 
certain statements contained in registration statements.157 The 
plaintiffs alleged causes of action against EnergySolutions, Inc. 
(ES), twelve of ES’s officers and directors, and ENV Holdings, 
Inc. (ENV), ES’s parent company.158 The plaintiffs alleged that the 
registration statements filed by ES contained numerous false and 
misleading statements and that each defendant made the 
misstatements.159 After citing Janus, specifically its language 
regarding attribution, the court ruled that ES and the defendants 
who actually signed the registration statements clearly made the 
misstatements.160 The court absolved two of the other individual 
defendants for three primary reasons: (1) they did not sign the 
statements; (2) they were not directors in ES at the time the 
registration statements were filed; and (3) they did not have 
authority over the registration statements’ content.161  
The court’s final evaluation focused on ENV, which was the 
sole owner of ES.162 ENV was solely owned by the “Sponsors and 
                                                                                                             
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See City of Roseville Emps. Ret. Sys. v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 814 F. 
Supp. 2d 395, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 158. See id. at 401, 407. 
 159. See id. at 403−04. 
 160. Id. at 417. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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Management” (sponsors).163 Similar to the entities in Janus, ES 
and ENV were distinct legal entities that shared the same 
individuals in key management positions.164 However, unlike 
Janus, the registration statements specified that the sponsors would 
control ES and that they controlled all matters requiring 
shareholder approval.165 The sponsors controlled ES through ENV, 
which meant that ENV had ultimate authority over ES’s actions.166 
Despite ENV not signing the registration statements, the court 
found that ENV did “make” the misstatements due to their control 
over ES.167 As the court concluded:  
Here, where the Registration Statements contain so many 
indicia of control, the lack of an explicit statement that 
ENV was speaking through the Registration Statements 
does not control the answer to the question of whether it 
made those statements. A reasonable jury could find that, 
on the facts alleged here, ENVs role went well beyond that 
of “a speechwriter draft[ing] a speech,” because, with 
regard to ES’s sales of shares owned by ENV, ENV had 
control over the content of the message, the underlying 
subject matter of the message, and the ultimate decision of 
whether to communicate the message.168 
Overall, City of Roseville should not be surprising. The court 
found that both ES and the other signing defendants did “make” 
the misstatements.169 Clearly, by signing the statements, ES and 
the individuals attributed the statements to themselves. The 
potential shock in City of Roseville results from the court also 
holding ENV liable for the misstatements.170 However, this, too, 
should not be surprising based on the language in Janus. The Court 
in Janus stated that the person or entity who “makes” a statement 
is “the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, 
including its content and whether and how to communicate it.”171 
Based on this language, ENV doomed themselves through the 
declarations contained in ES’s registration statements, specifically 
                                                                                                             
 163. Id. “Sponsors and Management” is the exact language contained in ES’s 
registration statement from November 2007. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. at 418. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 169. See id. at 417. 
 170. See id. at 418. 
 171. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 
2302 (2011). 
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the statements regarding how the sponsors controlled ES.172 
Because the sponsors owned 100% of ENV, and ENV owned 
100% of ES, ENV controlled ES and thus would have ultimate 
authority over the registration statements issued by ES.173 
Therefore, using the language from Janus, ENV did “make” the 
misstatements because it was the person or entity with ultimate 
control over ES’s statements. 
Despite these prior rulings, nothing prevents other federal 
courts from using an interpretation of Janus that completely 
absolves corporate officers of liability. Lower courts can interpret 
Supreme Court decisions in vastly different ways.174 Hence, at this 
point in time, determining what lower courts will do is extremely 
difficult. Although one cannot predict all of the potential negative 
consequences of the Janus opinion’s attribution language, the 
majority’s reasoning clearly leaves open the possibility for far-
reaching problems. 
3. Examples of Janus’s Impact 
Despite the potential for Janus to absolve corporate officers 
from liability, there are certain situations in which it is clear that an 
officer would “make” a statement. For instance, if a company 
officer signs a statement, he would be attributing the statement to 
himself, and thus he is deemed to “make” that statement, based on 
Janus.175 
A more complicated example involves a corporate officer 
verbalizing a prepared statement at a press conference. If the 
officer explicitly states that he is speaking solely for the 
corporation in his capacity as an officer, it is unlikely that a court 
could hold him liable as a maker of the statements, even if the 
                                                                                                             
 172. City of Roseville, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 418. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See Todd G. Cosenza, Applying Stoneridge to Restrict Secondary Actor 
Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 64 BUS. LAW. 59, 60 (2008). The ability for lower 
courts to interpret Supreme Court precedent in vastly different ways was evident 
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(citing In re DVI Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196 (E.D. Pa. 2008)). However, 
contrary to the Pennsylvania court’s holding, the California Eastern District 
Court imposed liability on a law firm that played a substantial role in composing 
a fraudulent disclosure despite no public identification of the firm. See id. (citing 
Lopes v. Vieira, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2008)). 
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Roseville, 814 F. Supp. 2d 395. 
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officer fraudulently constructed the statements. This would be the 
corporation’s statement, not the officer’s statement. The 
corporation would be “the person or entity with ultimate authority 
over the statement,” which means it would be the maker of the 
statement under Rule 10b-5.176  
Some may view the officer in this scenario as the speaker and 
speechwriter within Justice Thomas’ speaker–speechwriter 
analogy.177 However, this is not the case. If the officer created the 
statement, then clearly he would be the speechwriter within the 
analogy. Yet, he is not also the speaker. When giving the 
statement, the officer is speaking on behalf of the corporation, not 
on behalf of himself. The corporation is the speaker, and the 
officer is simply representing the corporation. As legal entities, 
corporations can only act through their officers and agents.178 
Justice Thomas’s speaker–speechwriter analogy presumes two 
autonomous individuals, who each can act for themselves.179 A 
corporation is not an entity that can act for itself.180 Instead, it must 
act through others.181 The officer in this scenario is actually the 
mouthpiece of the company, which means that the company is still 
the speaker within the analogy.  
However, what if the officer goes on to take questions from the 
press and provides unscripted answers? Under Janus, a court 
would likely still absolve the corporate officer of liability. When a 
corporate officer speaks on the company’s behalf, he is speaking 
with the company’s authority, and the company’s instructions and 
information are shaping what he is saying. In other words, the 
corporate officer, despite the statement being unscripted, is still 
giving a statement that is ultimately within the control of and 
attributed to the company. Looking at this entire situation, it is 
almost comical that the officer could escape liability. Essentially, 
the officer would be arguing that he did not actually “make” the 
statements that, in common parlance, he made to the public. This is 
just one situation demonstrating the outrageousness of Janus. 
Perhaps the greatest impact of the Janus decision will be its 
effect on the corporate press release. For a large corporation, 
issuing a press release will typically involve many individuals 
                                                                                                             
 176. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 
2302 (2011). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 2011 
WL 3444199, at *25 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011). 
 179. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
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looking at and revising it prior to distribution.182 What if one of 
those individuals puts a particular statement in it that he knows is 
false? Each individual officer will not sign the press release. 
Rather, the statement will be attributed to the corporation as a 
whole. Because the statement is not attributed to any particular 
corporate officer, but rather to the corporation as a whole, the 
corporation would be the maker of that statement. Under Janus, 
attribution “is strong evidence that a statement was made by—and 
only by—the party to whom it is attributed.”183 Additionally, even 
though attribution may only be a rebuttable presumption of who 
“makes” a statement, it is unlikely that a corporate officer will be 
viewed as the individual with “ultimate authority” over a statement 
that is not attributed to him.184 Thus, the perpetrating officer will 
likely escape liability for his fraudulent actions, and the 
corporation and its shareholders will be left bearing the financial 
burden for the officer’s unlawful acts. As is evident by these 
examples, outside of situations in which either the officer cannot 
legally escape attribution or the officer unintentionally attributes 
the statement to himself, the Janus decision will absolve corporate 
officers and other agents from liability for their fraudulent 
statements because they would not be the makers of those 
statements. 
III. RAMIFICATIONS OF JANUS 
A. Janus Contradicts the Deterrence Function of the Private 10b-5 
Right of Action 
Janus undercuts the use of the Rule 10b-5 private action as a 
deterrent to fraudulent conduct. When discussing the Rule 10b-5 
private action, commentators generally provide two policy 
rationales for its existence: compensation and deterrence.185 
However, the 10b-5 private action should not be viewed as a 
compensation tool. Whether from judgments or settlements, the 
vast majority of compensation paid to investors is actually funded 
by the investors themselves.186 Accordingly, securities litigation 
                                                                                                             
 182. Allowing one person, without any supervision, to issue an important 
press release would clearly be an unreasonable corporate procedure. 
 183. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 184. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 185. E.g., John A. MacKerron, The Price Integrity Cause of Action Under 
Rule 10b-5: Limiting and Expanding the Use of the Fraud on the Market 
Theory, 69 OR. L. REV. 177, 183–84 (1990).  
 186. Travis S. Souza, Comment, Freedom to Defraud: Stoneridge, Primary 
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mostly involves moving money from some investors to pay other 
investors, a result sometimes referred to as “robbing Peter to pay 
Paul.”187 Money will shift from the current investors to those 
investors who purchased stock in the affected period.188 Typically, 
the investors who suffer are those long-term investors who still 
own shares in the company, while the short-term speculators 
benefit as a result of their coincidental purchase of shares during 
the relevant time period.189 The short-term speculators will escape 
with the damages awarded to them, whereas the long-term 
investors who recover will have their damages netted out by the 
contemporaneous payment of damages and decrease in stock 
price.190 Securities litigation tends to result in investors simply 
having to bear their own losses, which is inconsistent with a 
purported goal of compensation.191 Justice White echoed this 
anticompensation sentiment in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.192 In his 
dissent, Justice White advocated against using 10b-5 for 
compensatory purposes when he stated that the Securities 
Exchange Act did not support a conversion of Rule 10b-5 into “a 
scheme of investor’s insurance.”193 
Instead, the main purpose for the 10b-5 private action should 
be its prophylactic effect of deterring corporations and corporate 
officers from engaging in fraudulent conduct.194 Through holding 
culpable actors liable and imposing a financial burden on them, 
those actors and other similarly situated individuals are less likely 
                                                                                                             
 
1201 (2008) (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: 
An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation 7, 14–15 (Columbia Law Sch. 
Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 293, 2006), available at 
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 187. Id.; Adam Reiser, Note, Compensating Defrauded Investors While 
Preserving the SEC’s Mission of Deterrence: A Call for Congress to Counteract 
the Troubling Consequences of Stoneridge, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 257, 264 (2009). 
 188. Souza, supra note 186, at 1202. 
 189. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 262 (1988) (White, J., 
dissenting); see also Richard A. Booth, The End of Securities Fraud Class 
Action?, 29 REG. 46, 50 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 917393 
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 190. See Souza, supra note 186, at 1201; Booth, supra note 189, at 50. 
 191. Souza, supra note 186, at 1203. 
 192. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 252 (White, J., dissenting). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Sirkin, supra note 9, at 311. 
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to commit fraud in the future.195 Because people consistently act 
for their self-interest, an individual who knows that he could 
potentially bear financial responsibility for his conduct is likely to 
refrain from engaging in fraudulent conduct in order to avoid the 
negative consequences.196 Compensating investors should only be 
used as a means to further the 10b-5 private action’s primary goal 
of deterring fraud by holding corporations and officers financially 
responsible for their fraudulent acts. 
Despite Rule 10b-5’s main value being its prophylactic effects, 
the Court’s holding in Janus eliminates much of its deterrence 
function. A system that absolves actors from possible liability 
removes much of the disincentive to engaging in fraudulent 
conduct.197 Post-Janus, even actors, such as corporate officers who 
write the fraudulent statements and have them distributed, can 
escape liability under the 10b-5 private action as long as the issued 
statements are not attributed to them.198 Due to this ability to 
escape liability, corporate officers could be more inclined to 
engage in fraudulent conduct in order to realize some of the 
beneficial effects of fraud, such as a potential short-term increase 
in stock prices through erroneous statements issued to the public. 
For example, as long as the misstatements are not attributed to 
him, an officer can realize the short-term gains through selling his 
stock, without any personal liability under a 10b-5 private action. 
After Janus, corporate officers will no longer make the mistake of 
attributing statements to themselves, unlike the defendant in In re 
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Merck.199 Therefore, through the narrow definition of make that 
Janus provides, the Supreme Court has destroyed the effectiveness 
of the 10b-5 action as a fraud-deterrence mechanism. 
B. Ineffectiveness of SEC Enforcement Action 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Janus could also affect the 
SEC’s ability to impose aiding-and-abetting liability through the 
SEC enforcement action. In order for the SEC to pursue aiding-
and-abetting liability, there must be a primary violation of Rule 
10b-5.200 However, in certain situations, there may be no primary 
violation. Under Janus, the corporation is considered to “make” 
the statements that are attributed to it, whereas the corporate 
officer who actually composed the statement does not “make” it.201 
However, often only the corporate officer knows the statement is 
deceptive, whereas the corporation’s board of directors is 
completely in the dark. Will courts be willing to impute the 
officer’s knowledge to the corporation and its board of 
directors?202 Currently, no definitive theory regarding imputing 
scienter to a corporate defendant exists.203 Yet, it appears that if a 
single officer possesses the fraudulent intent and writes the 
statement, the court will impute his scienter to the corporation.204 
However, in his dissent, Justice Breyer acknowledged that, as a 
result of the Janus majority’s opinion, there could be a situation 
where no one would be liable: neither the guilty officers because 
they did not “make” the misstatement, nor the innocent board of 
directors who did not know of the misstatement. It is unlikely that 
Justice Breyer is implying that courts will not impute officers’ 
scienter to their corporation. But, his statements in Janus do raise 
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 200. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (Supp. V 2011). 
 201. See discussion supra Part II. 
 202. Fully evaluating this question is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 203. Currently, at least two different theories appear to impute scienter. First 
is the collective-scienter approach, which “aggregates the misstatements or 
omissions by one corporate player with the intent or knowledge of another that 
the statements were fraudulent.” Heather F. Crow, Comment, Riding the Fence 
on Collective Scienter: Allowing Plaintiffs to Clear the PSLRA Pleading Hurdle, 
71 LA. L. REV. 313, 326 (2010). The other approach that the courts have adopted 
only permits the imputation of the knowledge of the officer who made the 
misstatement. See, e.g., Southland Secs. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 
365 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2005); Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. 
Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 204. The collective-scienter doctrine only changes how to impute scienter 
when there is no single officer who created the statement and had the fraudulent 
intent behind the statement. See Crow, supra note 203, at 326. 
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questions regarding when courts will impute an officer’s scienter 
to the corporation. If a court does not impute the officer’s scienter, 
then there is no primary violation of Rule 10b-5 by the corporation, 
and not even the SEC enforcement action can be used to hold 
corporate officers liable. Nonetheless, despite Justice Breyer’s 
statements, if a single officer composes a statement with fraudulent 
intent, a court will likely continue to impute the officer’s guilty 
knowledge to the corporation.205 By imputing the officer’s scienter 
to the corporation that “makes” the statement, there could still be a 
primary violation of Rule 10b-5, and thus the SEC could still 
impose aiding-and-abetting liability on the corporate officer. 
Nevertheless, the SEC enforcement action should not be relied 
upon as the primary deterrence mechanism for fraudulent conduct. 
Due to its limited resources, the SEC cannot prosecute every 
reported securities violation.206 This would still be the case even if 
Congress provided the agency with substantially more resources 
and funding.207 Additionally, the SEC tends to pursue the larger, 
more highly visible actors rather than the smaller, less noticeable 
claims.208 Finally, both Congress and the courts have 
acknowledged that private securities litigation is a “necessary 
supplement” to the SEC enforcement action.209 In fact, the 
Supreme Court has recognized the implied private action as the 
most effective means of enforcing the securities laws.210 The SEC 
has acknowledged that the private right of action is critical to the 
enforcement of Section 10(b);211 thus, it is also critical to 
enforcement of Rule 10b-5. It is unwise to rely on the SEC 
enforcement action to prevent fraudulent conduct because the 10b-
5 private action provides a necessary complement to deliver the 
greatest deterrent effect.  
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Additionally, private investors are naturally the best individuals 
to monitor a company’s activities. An investor has a personal 
interest in the company’s actions.212 Acting in his own self-
interest, the individual will monitor the company to ensure it is 
taking effective actions to make his investment profitable. It is true 
that not every investor has the time or financial acumen to actively 
monitor each of his or her investments.213 However, overall, it is 
better to have private investors monitor a company’s activities 
while the SEC supplements the investors’ oversight. Furthermore, 
as the Bernie Madoff scandal demonstrates, the SEC has shown in 
recent years how ineffective it can be in catching even extremely 
large fraudulent endeavors.214 Due to their vested interest in the 
company’s performance, private investors, with support from the 
SEC, are the best line of defense against fraud and are more apt to 
provide stricter scrutiny of a company’s activities.  
C. Rise of Section 20(b) 
In Janus, Justice Thomas alluded to the fact that Section 20(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act could provide a remedy to 
prosecute defendants who engage in conduct similar to JCM.215 
However, he refused to analyze Section 20(b) any further, instead 
opting to state that Janus does not address it.216 Section 20(b) 
makes it unlawful for a person to violate securities laws by using 
another person to carry out the prohibited acts.217 Currently, few 
courts have interpreted Section 20(b).218 Previously, Section 20(b) 
had been unnecessary in Rule 10b-5 cases because Rule 10b-5 
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used to impose liability on both corporations and officers.219 
Nevertheless, as a result of Janus, the majority seems to infuse life 
into Section 20(b).  
To impose liability under Section 20(b), there must be control, 
culpable participation by the controlling person, and a securities 
law violation.220 It could be used to impose liability on corporate 
officers who intentionally act through another person or entity, 
such as the corporation for which they work, to violate securities 
laws. Section 20(b) would impose liability only on the person who 
is using the other person to commit the securities law violation.221 
Thus, it seems like a viable tool that could aid in correcting the 
problems that Janus created. However, due to the lack of 
jurisprudence or other authority regarding Section 20(b), it will 
take time to determine how effective Section 20(b) will be in 
fixing the Janus problem whereby corporate officers can escape 
liability for their intentional misstatements that are attributed to the 
company.222 
The primary question with Section 20(b) is whether the Court 
will recognize an implied right of action for it. In Janus, the 
majority explicitly noted that it was not addressing whether 
Section 20(b) imposed liability on entities acting through innocent 
intermediaries.223 Section 20(b) does not contain explicit language 
providing for a private right of action.224 In recent years, the Court 
has taken a limiting approach regarding private rights of action, as 
evident in its recent treatment of the 10b-5 private action.225 Thus, 
whether the Supreme Court is willing to recognize a private right 
of action for Section 20(b) remains uncertain, and the Janus 
opinion gives no significant indication as to which way the Court 
is currently leaning.226 
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IV. LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES 
Undoubtedly, reform is necessary. Based on Central Bank, 
Stoneridge, and Janus, clearly the Supreme Court will not be the 
avenue for this reform. The Court in Janus reaffirmed its position 
that any change regarding liability under a securities law must 
come from Congress and not the courts.227 Consequently, the two 
potential reform methods would be a congressional statute or an 
SEC rule, with the SEC rule being more feasible. 
A. Congressional Action 
Congress can pass a statute refining the definition of make to 
prevent the problems arising from Janus. The statute should clarify 
that the person who “makes” a misstatement is “any person or 
entity that substantially participates in the drafting or dissemination 
of the statement, regardless of the attribution of that statement.” 
This language would eliminate the potential for corporate officers 
to escape liability based solely on a lack of attribution. The courts 
would then bear the responsibility for determining the meaning of 
substantially participates. Because Congress is acting, there is no 
concern about reinstituting aiding-and-abetting liability for the 
10b-5 private action through the definition of make. Congress has 
the power to override a judicial interpretation of legislation by 
passing new legislation.228 The primary problem with legislative 
reform is that passing a new statute is a difficult task. Both houses 
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of Congress must agree on one proposal—a task that has become 
exponentially more difficult due to Congress’s current polarized 
state.229  
B. SEC Rulemaking 
A new SEC rule would be much easier to pass because it only 
requires SEC action rather than a vote of Congress.230 Just like a 
statute, the rule should clarify the meaning of make to ensure that 
corporate officers could not possibly escape liability for their 
unattributed misstatements. Yet, unlike a statute, the rule could not 
bring back aiding-and-abetting liability for the 10b-5 private 
action. The Supreme Court in both Central Bank and Stoneridge 
engaged in statutory interpretation of Section 10(b).231 The Court 
has already established that an administrative agency cannot 
override Supreme Court precedent that interprets a statute.232 Thus, 
by conducting statutory interpretation in Central Bank and 
Stoneridge, the Supreme Court has foreclosed the possibility of 
using an SEC rule to reimplement aiding-and-abetting liability.233  
In Janus, however, the Supreme Court only interpreted Rule 
10b-5, so the SEC has the authority to override the interpretation.234 
Nonetheless, in exercising its rulemaking authority, the SEC must 
walk the thin line between clarifying the definition of make and 
implementing aiding-and-abetting liability. Keeping this in mind, 
one potential version of the rule could be the following: For 
purposes of Rule 10b-5, to “make” a misstatement includes 
drafting or writing a statement with knowledge that it is false and 
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distributing or having that statement distributed to the public, 
irrespective of whether the statement is attributed to the individual 
drafting or writing it. 
Regardless of the rule’s language, it is likely that any new rule 
will be subject to legal challenges claiming that it is a roundabout 
attempt to reestablish aiding-and-abetting liability. In making their 
determination, courts will be looking at whether the rule is 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s abolition of aiding-and-
abetting liability in Central Bank.235 It should be noted that any 
challenge based on Central Bank would not affect the rule’s 
applicability to SEC enforcement actions because Congress has 
already given the SEC the ability to pursue aiding-and-abetting 
liability.236 However, challenges based on reestablishing aiding-
and-abetting liability will be a problem for the private cause of 
action because Congress has yet to reinstitute aiding-and-abetting 
liability for the private actions.  
The SEC may choose to use expansive language that 
potentially contradicts the Court’s prior holding in Central Bank. 
Whenever any litigation concerning the validity of the SEC Rule 
reaches the Supreme Court, the Court’s ultimate decision regarding 
the validity of an expansive SEC Rule is uncertain. Currently, at 
least four Justices feel that a broader definition of make is 
warranted.237 Predicting how the Court would rule is difficult 
because this would partially depend on a case’s factual 
circumstances. Thus, the SEC could draft an expansive rule 
regarding the definition of make, knowing that the Supreme Court 
may strike it down, yet all along hoping that a majority of the 
Court will side with them in any subsequent legal action. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As a result of Janus, the viability of the private 10b-5 cause of 
action as a fraud-deterrence mechanism has been undermined. The 
majority’s narrow definition for make essentially absolves 
corporate officers of responsibility for their fraudulent acts under 
the 10b-5 private action, so long as their misstatements are not 
attributed to them. As a result, corporate officials will focus on 
organizing and distributing their statements in such a way as to 
escape potential liability under the private 10b-5 cause of action. 
Officers will no longer make the same mistake as the defendant in 
                                                                                                             
 235. See id. 
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 237. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 
2305 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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In re Merck & Co., a case in which the misstatements were 
attributed to the corporate officer individually, rather than the 
company.238 
By absolving corporate officers of liability for their action, 
Janus eliminates much of the 10b-5 private action’s prophylactic 
effect. Instead of increasing deterrence, the Supreme Court has 
removed much of the disincentives to engaging in fraudulent 
conduct. Consequently, either Congress or the SEC must take 
action because the Court refuses to be the engine for reform. 
Therefore, despite the potential far-reaching problems emanating 
from Janus, the decision may actually result in some of the most 
significant securities legislation in the last decade, as either the 
SEC, Congress, or both may finally take meaningful action 
regarding the future of the private 10b-5 cause of action. 
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